Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Nothing Rational About Conflict With Iran

Nothing Inevitable About War With Iran

Somewhat optimistic analysis of what kind of political maneuvering we're starting to see vis-a-vis the Iranian paradox. I wrote an immensely wordy Facebook post allowing myself to vent about our politicking around with the Iranian issue a couple of weeks back, and resolved to make it one of my first blog posts when I wasn't so frustrated with the entire debacle.

Less emotionally-charged, but no less frustrated with our politicians' handling of the matter. So much so that I'd consider it the most dangerous foreign policy initiative we've had since Vietnam. And to be blunt, I think that the Iranian war-hawks are more misguided and dangerous than proponents of other disastrous wars (Vietnam, Iraq) because they have the luxury of perspective. In Vietnam and Iraq, the disaster wouldn't become apparent until much later, and we were able to draw lessons from them (however fleeting.) It took the United States nearly 35 years before they would commit to a significant military operation against another country. Policymakers in 2012, on the other hand, know full well what they're signing US forces up for, and they can't not know how idiotic it is. Nonetheless, the drum beats to war are sounding louder than ever.

Trying to get a decent perspective of this in conventional media outlets, however, is a daunting task. Even the most moderate of news agencies are rife with hype, and there's a daily "analysis" of the "coming war with Iran" no matter where you turn. Truly, it's the media fueling this massive hype up, the same way they did in 2003 with Iraq, and like the lead-up to the Iraq War, rational perspective is a scarce commodity. In an election year, everyone from Congressional hawks, Republican contenders, and even our Dear Leader are hopping on the Military Option bandwagon. This makes for a frustrating political situation, from any rational person's perspective.

First and foremost, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta revealed just a couple of weeks ago that Iran is not trying build a nuclear weapon, but rather that all credible reports indicate that Iran is seeking to acquire what's known as nuclear "breakout capability". For those who may not be familiar with what exactly that misleadingly small change of semantics entails, it's the difference between possessing a functioning nuclear weapon and merely the capability to produce one in a relatively small timeframe, if needed. Now, that might not seem like a huge difference, but in fact it changes the entire tone of the conversation. Despite what sensationalist media and vote-hungry politicians would have you believe, nuclear breakout capability is not a huge leap from simply possessing nuclear generation capability, as permitted under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In fact, the list of nations that possess such a 'capability' to produce a nuclear device in short order includes Turkey, Japan, South Africa, Argentina, South Korea, Australia, and Canada, and that's just the ones we know about. Conceivably, any nation that possesses nuclear generation capability, with a relatively small investment of money can reach the same "breakout capability" (though at high political cost.) This small, but crucial differentiation recasts the "Iranian menace" in completely new light.

Let's take a moment, however, and disregard that differentiation to study Iran, just for the sake of perspective. If we're going to understand exactly the regional dynamics that are at play here, we have to understand a little bit about Iran and it's motivations. Fundamentally, we're dealing with a theocracy. That being said, Iran's theocracy is not quite the same brand of radical theocracy as some of the others we deal with on a daily basis, like Saudi Arabia, and the Shiite sect of Islam that Iran based it's '79 revolution on isn't nearly as radical or fundamental as, say, Wahhabi Saudi Arabia or even the region's various Muslim Brotherhood factions, which we don't consider a major threat to Israel. Iranian foreign policy since 1979 has consistently been based on pragmatism; not ideological fundamentalism. Even Tehran's opposition to Israel is rooted more in it's anti-colonial (read: anti-British) sentiment, and being Persian means that they aren't swayed by notions of Arab solidarity quite so easily. In fact, even suggesting that Israel is Iran's most significant regional rival would be completely misunderstanding regional dynamics, particularly those at play between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which analysts have written about at length for the better part of a decade.

Secondly, Iran has a semblance of a democracy. No, it's not the pure republic of the West, but it's unquestionably more democratic than many regional nations we consider allies on any given day (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman) and is no less democratic than other major Western allies like Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, or Pakistan. Considering that an Iranian friend of mine once admitted that the greatest threat to the Iranian government is Iranians themselves, this is significant. The rigged elections of 2009 aside, the Iranian population has a moderating effect on it's leaders, and in any case with a 92% approval rate of the nuclear program, doesn't change the nuclear conversation very much. But to suggest that Iran is some irrational, rogue state hell-bent on causing regional havoc is just plain propaganda.

Which leads me to point number three, which is that not in the history of Iran's existence as a state has it engaged in offensive action against another nation. (The last events that could even be considered are the Russian-Persian Wars of the 19th Century, all of which resulting in Russian victory.) Indeed, since it's inception, Iran has been the victim of numerous offensive actions, beginning in 1953 with the Anglo-American overthrow of  Mohammad Mosaddegh, continuing into the 1979 Iranian Revolution, climaxing with Saddam Hussein's vicious war of aggression throughout the 1980s. This isn't to gloss over Iran's asymmetrical warfare attempt to subvert Western and Israeli influence in the Levant via non-state actors in Syria and Lebanon, but it would be a mistake to a) paint Hezbollah as an arm of the Iranian state, or b) equate support for such groups as a "war of aggression" against other states. Such comparisons are outlandish and only contribute to an already distorted view of the regional dynamic. 


To put this in geopolitical perspective, what we're dealing with in Iran is a moderate authoritarian (but not particularly ideological) regime, similar to pre-revolutionary Egypt, whose number one concern is survival for that regime's institution and has never engaged in offensive warfare against another state. There is precisely zero credible evidence to suggest that possessing "nuclear breakout capability" would change those basic realities. Furthermore, it sees massive American military presence in its east in Afghanistan as well as its west in Iraq. Years of crippling sanctions have decimated it's conventional military forces and civil war in Syria (as well as general Arab unrest) have paralyzed and jeopardized it's traditional and asymmetric capabilities. Looking around it's own neighborhood, Tehran sees Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Israel all possessing nuclear weapons. With daily mounting speculation of an impending strike, is it any wonder that a paranoid, desperate regime would want to possess the effective deterrent against foreign aggression, faced with these odds? Is there no merit to the school of thought that says possessing a nuclear capability would do more to assuage and moderate a frantic regime, rather than radicalize and embolden it, as the war sirens loudly declare?

The true frustrating part, however, is the constant rhetoric, and how this rhetoric isn't likely to abate. We can discuss the consequences of an Israeli or US strike on Iran all day long, but the fact that we have to have that conversation shows how far along we are on the path to war. Being an election year, the urge for all of the candidates (including Obama) to be "more macho than thou" in foreign policy distracts us from entirely more pressing domestic concerns and distorts the reality of the situation, all the while leading the country like oblivious sheep down a path to a messy, destructive, and economically crippling war. We went through this in 2003, folks. It's especially bewildering considering the extensive areas of mutual cooperation possible between Iran and the United States, and at this point we have to wonder what's been slipped into the coffee of our policymakers.

The fact that we are seriously considering negotiating with the Taliban, and yet it's political suicide to mention sitting down and talking to the Iranian regime without outrageous preconditions shows just how far off the deep end we've gone in terms of rational foreign policy in the Persian Gulf.

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Is Democracy Always the Answer?


What if 'The People' Don't Want Democracy?

This is a rather interesting Op-Ed regarding social attitudes towards democracy in various parts of the world. I really liked the principle that the article was attempting to articulate, even if I have qualms about the way it is written and the tone used.

The author clearly has a bias, and it's proudly on display in the piece (as well as in some of the flawed conclusions they come to with the polling data), but it illuminates a concept that I've had rolling around in my head for some time: is democracy always the perfect solution to ailing societies?

I've debated this with peers regarding the West's decade-long quagmire in Afghanistan before, and found myself on the same side of the argument that the author uses here. The primary argument is essentially that the West, in general, puts entirely too much focus on democracy, often touting it as a cure-all for every broken state and a miracle solution for all instability around the world, to the detriment of its own ideals and the well-being of the state or society in question. I think that we in the West, with our advanced economies; established, entrenched democracies; and generally stable societies, often over-emphasize the importance of democracy in other parts of the world, to a degree where I think we're blinded to what is actually needed in the country. I think that the polling data reflects that, and I also think that nowhere on earth is that more beautifully illustrated than in Afghanistan.

It's unsurprising that a good amount of people in developing countries regard democracy with an apathetic attitude. The telling part of the polling data, the most illuminating and also the part that the author seems to dismiss, is that the places where unequivocal and unqualified approval of democracy is lowest is also the places that are poorest, and places that are the most unstable. In all societies and all political constructs, I believe that people desire two things, primarily: economic prosperity and stability. I think that these two concerns trump freedom, equality, political participation, and even human rights in some cases. It's unsurprising that the two are intertwined. One finds that in the vast majority of cases, states that are the poorest tend to be the most unstable, and vice-versa, and that economic activity and social stability are two-sides of the same proverbial coin.

I think that when you dig down to the crux of society vis-a-vis political systems (and in many of these countries, one is talking about war ravaged and ethnic strife-ridden societies where they are, quite literally, the barest form of society) we find that people crave stability more than anything, and in virtually all cases, a strong ruler who is capable of maintaining stability is preferable to a messy and cumbersome democracy. This is particularly true when that democracy is of questionable legitimacy to some sects of the populace and doesn't have the strength to extend it's rule of law over the most unstable parts of the country. We see this in Somalia, we see it in Pakistan, and we see it in Libya and Egypt now. What good is democracy if they can't control the population and maintain the stability that is necessary for life to take on some semblance of normalcy?

It should come as no surprise that economic prosperity is a direct consequence of internal stability, just as instability is more often than not a direct or indirect consequence of economic destitution. A strong ruler that can maintain order and kick-start an economy is going to be significantly more popular than a democracy that can't maintain order and thus, can't promote economic activity. We've seen this before: Tunisia is a sterling example. Decades of authoritarian rule resulted in one of the most stable, economically prosperous countries in Northern Africa and the wider Arab world. Thanks to our (the West's) willingness to support authoritarian rulers if it served our interests, Ben Ali made the right friends, cut the right deals, and for a time, enjoyed significant economic dividends that stabilized the country.

Of course, as time goes on, these rulers become corrupt and more oligarchic. And thus, when a population has achieved a relative stability and measure of financial success, they begin to concern themselves with things like political participation. Once an individual has empowered himself through his financial status, suddenly the things his rulers do start to matter to him. Suddenly he is much more concerned with what his leaders do, and will demand accountability, transparency, and good governance. And that's when the population will focus on political change. Sometimes it's peaceful, many times it's not. Either way, it happens in due time.

There is an old saying that "dictatorships are great at building nations; democracies are best at running them."  A certain level of political maturity is required for an effective democracy, and it is worth considering this frame of reference when dealing with some of the most troubled states in the world. Democracy is the prevailing system not because the victorious democratic powers imposed it on the world, but because all else being equal, it's the best political system we've been able to come up with. Unfortunately, however, all things are not always equal, and when push comes to shove, good governance is preferable to amateur democracy. That will come in time, as it did in the West not all that long ago.

Citizen of the Planet

Welcome to the inaugural post of my blog, Citizen of the Planet. This will be my primary means of creative and analytical pondering, armchair theorizing, and just jotting down thoughts on world affairs, politics (both American and foreign), and related topics. It's mostly to spare my Facebook page and the number of forums I belong to some of my longer and more rambling musings on a myriad of political topics. Just as well, I feel that sometimes the thoughts go to waste there, anyhow.

To be clear, I don't expect anyone to actively read this blog, though I suppose that if I'm going to put it out there, it's better to put it someplace wherein the viewers of it (accidentally or not) are reading it because they are genuinely interested in what I have to say, as opposed to me putting it in the faces of those who didn't care for it to begin with. At the very least, if no one's reading it, it means that it's not an eyesore for anyone else.

To start, I don't generally like these kinds of opening posts, primarily because I don't actually like talking about myself and also because I often don't know how to begin projects like these. Where does one start to explain the evolution of a person's fascination with political and global affairs? How do I explain the urge to seek out historical accounts detailing the nuances lying at the heart of today's foreign relations quagmires? How do I describe to someone the immense interest I have in global economics and the role such global dynamics play in our everyday lives, to the degree where I actively seek this information, outside of any educational construct or mandate, and often find myself reading Thomas Friedman in my spare time? My best guess is that if you're reading this, you probably have similar urges, and thus I don't have to explain it to you. That's the point behind the blog, you see.

I'm also going to refrain from detailing my personal political beliefs in this inaugural post, being that primarily they are still evolving, as I believe the views and beliefs of all genuine thinkers are in a constant state of evolution. Additionally, that would be an awfully long inaugural post. However, to give any theoretical reader a sense of my frame of reference and what to expect from this blog-project, I will say that, in the general sense, I can call myself a believer in globalization, and a defender of the international socio-economic order imposed on the world by the United States after the Second World War, and that it's record is self-evident. I am a follower and admirer primarily of the strategist and political analyst Thomas P.M. Barnett, whom I consider to be among the greatest intellectual and strategic minds of our time. Surely, at some point, I will figure out how to link to his blog here somewhere.

The blog will focus primarily on international affairs, because that's the realm in which my interest mostly lies. However, given that I'm starting this blog at the height of an American election year, American (domestic, to me) politics will surely get plenty of attention for the next year or so. So for the sake of completion, I consider my political views to lie somewhere just a hair right of center, though only a hair. I don't profess allegiance or affiliation with any American political party, including the Libertarians or, God help them, the Green Party. Personally, I see merit in perspectives from across the political spectrum, and reject the "us or them" attitude adopted by the two dominant parties in the American political system. Though I'll refrain from delving into particulars here, and will save it for an upcoming post that will, no doubt, materialize sooner rather than later.

In taking the first step of actually creating the blog, I have, in effect, already accomplished the hardest part. In providing myself with a form of release for all of the monologues that exist in my head, I've already opened the floodgates, and I have a feeling this blog will be one of the most active endeavors of my creative life. I don't expect anyone to be reading it, but to the strays that do find themselves here, welcome, and I hope you enjoy it.